



RECOVERY PLAN AND RULE OF LAW CONDITIONALITY: 
A NEW ERA BECKONS?
By any standards, 2020 has been a painful year. A health crisis 
of historic proportions is still unravelling and, in addition to its human 
cost, it has far reaching adverse socio-economic repercussions the full 
extent of which is diffi cult to predict. The year also sees the curtains 
closing on the United Kingdom membership, a defi ning event in the evo-
lution of the Union. For the UK, withdrawal marks the greatest consti-
tutional reversal since the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. For the 
EU, it shatters the irreversibility of the ever closer union narrative. 2020 
also marks the end of a tumultuous decade where the EU has been beset 
by many emergencies, including the eurozone and migration crises. On 
a more positive note, the twilight of the year saw the adoption of a series 
of measures bringing into effect a comprehensive recovery package to 
counter the economic effects of COVID-19, including the accompanying 
rule of law conditionality Regulation.1 These make for seminal develop-
ments in EU law and deserve attention.
Recovery package and the new EU budget
In May 2020, following the invitation of the European Council, the 
Commission presented an ambitious recovery plan to counter the eco-
nomic impact of the COVID-19 epidemic.2 The plan, hailed somewhat 
over-ambitiously as Europe’s ‘Hamilton moment’, proposed ‘Next Gener-
ation EU’, a recovery instrument embedded in the new Multiannual Fi-
nancial Framework (MFF) for 2021−2027. The objective was to provide a 
‘comprehensive, bold and sustained’ response to the crisis and plan long 
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term for the well-being of the Union.3 In its meeting of July 2020, after 
marathon negotiations, the European Council reached a comprehensive 
agreement on the EU budget and a recovery package4 along the lines 
proposed by the Commission. The package runs to €1,824.3 billion and 
combines the MFF (€1,074.3 billion) and the Next Generation EU (NGEU) 
instrument of €750 billion, the latter being equivalent to approximately 
5¼ of EU annual GDP. The goal is to generate the funds necessary for 
sustainable and resilient recovery whilst supporting the EU’s green and 
digital priorities.5
Although the package was politically agreed in July, it was not 
transposed into law as there was an outstanding item: rule of law condi-
tionality. This emerged in the light of the Commission’s original proposal 
dating back to 2018,6 which had sought to link observance of rule of law 
standards with sound fi nancial management, and in the shadow of the 
rule of law regression in Poland and Hungary which continues to exercise 
Europe. In its July conclusions, the European Council proclaimed that 
the Union’s fi nancial interests would be protected in accordance with the 
values of Article 2 TEU and stated that a regime of conditionality to pro-
tect the budget and the NGEU would be introduced.7 There followed an 
agreement at Council level on the contents of the conditionality regime8 
and a juxtaposition with Poland and Hungary who, in a joint declaration, 
objected to the link between the rule of law and the EU budget.9
In its 10−11 December 2020 meeting, the European Council reached 
a compromise which opened the road for the adoption of the recovery 
package.10 The package is based on four pillars. A Council Regulation 
3   Commission, ‘Amended proposal for a Council Decision on the system of Own Resources 
of the European Union’ COM(2020) 445 fi nal Brussels, 1.
4  See Conclusions of the Special meeting of the European Council (17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 
July 2020) EUCO 10/20, CO EUR 8, CONCL 4, Brussels, 21 July 2020 (‘July Conclusions’).
5  See July Conclusions (n 4) para A2.
6  Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on 
the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised defi ciencies as regards the rule 
of law in the Member States’ COM(2018) 324 fi nal.
7  See July Conclusions (n 4) para A24 and annex to the conclusions, paras 22−23.
8  See the text of the mandate granted by COREPER on 30 September 2020 for the ne-
gotiations with Parliament: Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021−2027 and Re-
covery Package − Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a gener-
al regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget, Interinstitutional File: 
2018/0136(COD), 11322/20, Brussels, 30 September 2020.
9  See joint declaration by the Prime Ministers of Hungary and Poland, 26 November 
2020 <https://visegradpost.com/en/2020/11/26/eu-rule-of-law-joint-declaration-of-the-
prime-minister-of-poland-and-the-prime-minister-of-hungary/> accessed 31 December 
2020.
10  European Council meeting (10 and 11 December 2020) Conclusions, EUCO 22/20, CO 
EUR 17 CONCL 8, Brussels, 11 December 2020 (‘December Conclusions’).
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laying down the multiannual fi nancial framework for the years 2021 to 
2027 (Regulation No 2020/2093);11 a Council Decision on the system of 
own resources of the European Union (Decision 2020/2053);12 a Euro-
pean Parliament and Council Regulation on a general regime of condi-
tionality for the protection of the Union budget (Regulation 2020/2092);13 
and a Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Recovery and Resilience 
Facility, on which, at the time of writing, provisional agreement has been 
reached between the European Parliament and the Council.
Under the agreed package, to fund the NGEU, the Commission will be 
able to borrow up to €750 billion in 2018 prices on the fi nancial markets 
to be used for loans up to €360 billion and grants up to €390 billion.14 
The capital raised is to be repaid by 2058.15 Authority to the Commission 
to borrow is granted by the new Own Resources Decision adopted pursu-
ant to Article 311 TFEU, under the terms of which the decision may not 
come into force before it is approved by the Member States in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements.16 The powers granted to 
the Commission to borrow are limited in size, duration and scope.17 The 
amounts available under the NGEU will be allocated to seven programmes 
but the lion’s share (€672.5 billion) goes to the Recovery and Resilience 
Facility (RRF).18 The intention is to channel funds to the countries and 
sectors most affected by the crisis. 70% under the grants of the RRF will 
be committed in 2021 and 2022 and 30% will be committed in 2023. Al-
locations from the RRF in 2021−2022 will be established according to the 
Commission’s allocation criteria taking into account the respective living 
standards, size and unemployment levels of the Member States.19
In line with the principles of good governance, Member States are 
to prepare national recovery and resilience plans for 2021−2023. The 
plans will be assessed by the Commission and must be consistent with 
11  Council Regulation No 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual fi nancial framework for 
the years 2021 to 2027 [2020] OJ L433 I/11.
12  Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own 
resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU [2020] OJ L424/1.
13  Regulation 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a general re-
gime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [2020] OJ L433/I/1.
14  See July Conclusions (n 4) para A6 and Council Decision, 2020/2053 (n 12) Article 5(1).
15  Council Decision 2020/2053 (n 12) Article 5(2).
16  ibid, Article 5.
17  July Conclusions (n 4) para A4; and see Council Decision, 2020/2053 (n 12) Article 5.
18  See July Conclusions (n 4) para A14. The programmes are: Recovery and Resilience 
Facility: €672.5 billion (loans: €360 billion, grants: €312.5 billion); ReactEU: €47.5 billion; 
Horizon Europe: €5 billion; InvestEU: €5.6 billion; Rural Development: €7.5 billion; Just 
Transition Fund (JTF): €10 billion; RescEU: €1.9 billion.
19  See Special European Council, 17−21 July 2020 <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meet-
ings/european-council/2020/07/17-21/>  accessed 31 December 2020.
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the country specifi c recommendations made in the context of the Euro-
pean Semester. They must also contribute to growth and job creation 
and advance green and digital transitions. The plans will be adapted as 
necessary in 2022. Their assessment is to be approved by the Council by 
a qualifi ed majority on a proposal by the Commission. The disbursement 
of grants will take place only if agreed milestones and targets set out in 
the plans are fulfi lled. Where one or more Member States consider that 
there are serious deviations from the milestones and targets, they may 
request that the President of the European Council refer the matter to 
the next European Council.20
Provision is also made for a new own resource of the EU to fi nance 
the NGEU, namely a levy on non-recyclable plastic packaging that will 
be introduced in 2021.21 In addition, it is envisaged that the Commission 
will put forward a proposal for a carbon adjustment measure and a dig-
ital levy, both of which are to be introduced at the latest by 1 January 
2023.22 Notably, 30% of the total expenditure from the MFF and NGEU 
will target climate-related projects. Expenses under the MFF and NGEU 
will comply with the EU’s objective of climate neutrality by 2050, the 
EU’s 2030 climate targets and the Paris Agreement.23
Distinct features and assessment
The EU’s response to the COVID-19 crisis was rapid, ambitious and 
decisive. The new package has good prospects to succeed although the 
self-imposed triptych against which it is to be judged, ‘convergence, resil-
ience and transformation’, is a tall order.24 The EU’s response to the crisis 
was both joint and innovative.25 It provides for the fi rst time for collective 
debt at European Union level. It is a form of fi nancial risk mutualisation 
that has eluded the response to the Eurozone crisis and enhances soli-
darity and the idea of togetherness. This is particularly important as the 
20  July Conclusions (n 4) para A19.
21  Decision 2020/2053 (n 12) Article 2.
22  See July Conclusions (n 4) para A29. The Commission is also to put forward a proposal 
on a revised emissions trading scheme (ETS), possibly extending it to the aviation and mar-
itime sectors. The possibility of introducing a Financial Transaction Tax will be looked at in 
the course of the next MFF.
23  See Special European Council (n 19).
24  In presenting his proposals to the European Council, its President, Mr Charles Michel, 
stated as follows: ‘The goals of our recovery can be summarised in three words: fi rst con-
vergence, second resilience and third transformation. Concretely, this means: repairing 
the damage caused by COVID-19, reforming our economies and remodelling our societ-
ies’. Press release, 10 July 2020 <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-coun-
cil/2020/07/17-21/> accessed 31 December 2020.
25  See Special European Council (n 19).
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impact and costs of the pandemic appear to be unevenly spread in terms 
of sectors, Member States, and specifi c regions. A second distinct feature 
is that the fi nancial package is based on the disciplines of EU law prop-
er. This makes a break with the emphasis on intergovernmentalism that 
characterised the response to the Eurozone crisis and which has been 
endorsed, and even encouraged, by the Court of Justice.26 Thirdly, the 
universal and comprehensive character of the measures advances an in-
tegrated conception of the EU interest. By linking disbursement of funds 
with progress in strategic areas, the package interlaces the response 
to the pandemic with policy priorities and is forward looking. It is not 
simply a response to a crisis but a blueprint for development. Further-
more, this is the fi rst EU budget which is linked to climate objectives, 
even though perhaps more timidly than one would have hoped. The mea-
sures also enhance the presence of the EU in matters of economic policy, 
strengthening the subtle but steady shift of emphasis from the internal 
market to EMU governance as the prevalent model of integration. The 
package, built in response to a genuine crisis, sends a positive message 
to citizens. At the same time, there is no denying that it gives more power 
to the EU and thereby, by way of collateral effect, facilitates empire build-
ing. Although the funds that will be made available to the Member States 
are not subject to conditionality in the way it applied to ESM fi nancial 
assistance, the package does place budgetary and macro-economic sur-
veillance at the heart of the scheme and advances conditionality as a 
constitutional virtue.
Rule of law conditionality: high politics and low protection?
It is telling of the regression in the rule of law standards that has 
beset the EU in recent years that the most controversial issue faced by 
the European Council was the rule of law conditionality mechanism to 
accompany the recovery plan. Prior to the December European Coun-
cil meeting, two opposite camps emerged. Hungary and Poland, both 
of which are widely viewed as backsliding on rule of law standards, ap-
peared prepared to veto the EU budget and the recovery package unless 
the ties between spending and the rule of law became looser. In the 
event, the fi nal text agreed is, in terms of substance, close to the Sep-
tember Council draft27 although some concessions were obtained in the 
European Council Conclusions. 
26  See, eg in relation to the migration crisis, Case T-257/16 NM v European Council 
ECLI:EU:T:2017:130, and, in relation to the EuroGroup, Joined Cases C-105/15 P to 
C-109/15 P Mallis and Malli v Commission and ECB ECLI:EU:C:2016:702, and, especially, 
the recent judgment in Joined Cases C597/18 P, C598/18 P, C603/18 P and C604/18 P 
Council v Chrysostomides ECLI:EU:C:2020:1028.
27  See (n 8).
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Regulation 2020/2092 on the rule of law conditionality28 is a key part 
of the package. Its origins lie in a Commission proposal submitted in 2018 
which linked prudent fi nancial management with respect for the rule of 
law and sought to protect the Union’s budget in the case of generalised rule 
of law defi ciencies in a Member State.29 It was intended to apply from 2021 
with the start of the MFF 2021−2027 and came back to the fore following 
the recovery plan submitted by the Commission in May 2020. The Regu-
lation was adopted by qualifi ed majority following the European Council 
meeting of December 2020. Hungary and Poland voted against it30 and it 
is expected that its validity will be challenged before the CJEU. In com-
parison to the Commission’s original proposal, the agreed text provides 
for additional process and substantive safeguards to protect the interests 
of Member States and reduce the discretion of the Commission although 
in some limited respects it goes further than the Commission’s proposal. 
The Regulation is based on Article 322(1)(a) TFEU and requires ap-
propriate measures to be taken where rule of law breaches affect or se-
riously risk affecting the principles of sound fi nancial management or 
the protection of the fi nancial interests of the Union. The underlying 
rationale is that respect for the rule of law is an essential precondition 
for compliance with the principles of sound fi nancial management en-
shrined in Article 317 TFEU. Such management can only be ensured if 
national authorities act in accordance with the law, effectively pursue 
cases of fraud, corruption, and confl ict of interest, and unlawful deci-
sions are subject to review by an independent judiciary.31 The Regulation 
provides for the conditions under which measures may be taken, their 
contents, the procedure for their adoption, and their lifting. It is to apply 
from 1 January 202132 and its provisions may eventually be included in 
the Financial Regulation33 when it is next revised.34 The present piece 
28  Regulation 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a general re-
gime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [2020] OJ L433 I/1.
29  See (n 6).
30  Hungary and Poland voted against the regulation. See voting result, Position of the 
Council at fi rst reading with a view to the adoption of a Regulation of the European Par-
liament and of the Council on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the 
Union budget, Interinstitutional File: 2018/0136 (COD), Brussels, 14 December 2020 (OR 
en) 14020/20.
31  Preamble, recitals 7 and 8.
32  Article 10. It is not intended to have retroactive effect. Under the December 2020 Europe-
an Council conclusions, the measures will apply only in relation to budgetary commitments 
starting under the new Multiannual Financial Framework, including Next Generation EU. 
See European Council meeting (10 and 11 December 2020), Conclusions, EUCO 22/20 CO 
EUR 17 CONCL 8, Brussels, 11 December 2020, Conclusions, para 2(k).
33  Regulation 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018.
34  See Joint statement by the Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed to the 
European Parliament legislative resolution of 16 December 2020 on the Council position 
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provides an overview of the Regulation and focuses on the conditions 
that must be fulfi lled for measures to be taken and the decision-making 
process.
Conditions
For measures to be taken against a Member State, two conditions 
must be fulfi lled. There must, fi rst, be breaches of the principles of the 
rule of law and, secondly, those breaches must affect or seriously risk 
affecting the sound fi nancial management of the Union budget or the 
protection of the fi nancial interests of the Union in a suffi ciently direct 
way.35 Those conditions have undergone some changes since the Com-
mission’s original proposal and it is worth examining them in detail.
Breaches of the principles of the rule of law
The fi rst condition is that there must be breaches of the principles 
of the rule of law. The Regulation contains a comprehensive defi nition of 
the rule of law and makes it clear that the concept must be understood 
in conjunction with the other values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.36
Under the Commission’s original proposal, a prerequisite for the im-
position of measures was that there must be a generalised defi ciency 
as regards the rule of law.37 ‘Generalised defi ciency’ was defi ned as a 
widespread or recurrent practice or omission, or measure which affects 
the rule of law.38 The above terms have been replaced by the condition 
that there must be ‘breaches of the principles of the rule of law’.39 This is 
a stricter condition. The term breach implies a violation whilst the term 
defi ciency is open-ended, indicating lack of appropriate standards which 
may not necessarily cross the threshold of illegality.40 The term ‘breach-
at fi rst reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget 
(09980/1/2020 − C9-0407/2020 − 2018/0136(COD)), <www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/
document/TA-9-2020-0356_EN.html#title1> accessed 31 December 2020.
35  Article 4(1).
36  Under Article 2(a), the concept includes the principles of legality, implying a transparent, 
accountable, democratic and pluralistic law-making process; legal certainty; prohibition of 
arbitrariness of the executive powers; effective judicial protection, including access to jus-
tice, by independent and impartial courts, also as regards fundamental rights; separation 
of powers; and non-discrimination and equality before the law.
37  See Commission Proposal (n 6) Article 3(1).
38  ibid, Article 2(b).
39  Article 4(1).
40  The December 2020 European Council Conclusions expressly state that the Regulation 
does not relate to generalised defi ciencies. See December Conclusions (n 10) para 2(f).
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es’ in the plural, which is consistent throughout the Regulation,41 may 
suggest that a single breach does not suffi ce. The Regulation, however, 
does not appear to exclude individual breaches. Unlike the Commission’s 
original proposal, the fi nal text does not require that the violation must 
be widespread or recurrent. The objectives of the Regulation countenance 
that interpretation. A single but serious breach falls well within the mis-
chief that the Regulation seeks to counter. Whilst perhaps an isolated 
breach resulting from administrative practice may not suffi ce, the term 
breaches is best understood as having a qualitative rather than a quanti-
tative character. This is further supported by the preamble which states 
that rule of law breaches can seriously harm the fi nancial interests of the 
Union and that that ‘is the case for individual breaches […] and even more 
so for breaches that are widespread or due to recurrent practices or omis-
sions by public authorities, or to general measures adopted by such au-
thorities’.42 Legislation or administrative rules which run counter to the 
rule of law may amount to ‘breaches’ since they are of general application. 
Breaches may result from any branch of government or any authority ex-
ercising public power. In terms of frequency, there is a fi ne line as to when 
occasional violations by the administration or the judiciary cease to be 
viewed as insignifi cant and become actionable. Seriousness, frequency, 
and responses by the authorities in correcting errors are important fac-
tors. There is however no need to establish a pattern of breaches. 
Under Article 3, the following may be indicative of breaches of the 
principles of the rule of law: 
(a) endangering the independence of the judiciary;
(b) failing to prevent, correct or sanction arbitrary or unlawful deci-
sions by public authorities, including by law-enforcement authori-
ties, withholding fi nancial and human resources affecting their prop-
er functioning or failing to ensure the absence of confl icts of interest; 
(c) limiting the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies, in-
cluding through restrictive procedural rules and lack of implementa-
tion of judgments, or limiting the effective investigation, prosecution 
or sanctioning of breaches of law.
The violations listed are widely phrased and can be the result of 
either law or practice. 
The Regulation provides for a closed list of areas that the rule of law 
breaches must concern. In summary, under Article 4(2), these are the 
following:
41  See Article 1, Article 3, and Article 4(1).
42  See preamble, recital 15 (emphasis added).
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(a) the proper functioning of the authorities implementing the Union 
budget, including loans and other instruments guaranteed by the 
Union budget, in particular in the context of public procurement or 
grant procedures; 
(b) the proper functioning of the authorities carrying out fi nancial 
control, monitoring and audit;
(c) the proper functioning of investigation and prosecution services 
in relation to the investigation and prosecution of fraud, including 
tax fraud, corruption or other breaches of EU law relating to the im-
plementation of the budget or to the protection of the EU fi nancial 
interests; 
(d) the effective judicial review by independent courts of actions or 
omissions by the authorities referred to in points (a), (b) and (c); 
(e) the prevention and sanctioning of fraud, including tax fraud, cor-
ruption or other breaches of EU law relating to the implementation 
of the budget or to the protection of the EU fi nancial interests, and 
the imposition of effective and dissuasive penalties; 
(f) the recovery of funds unduly paid; 
(g) effective and timely cooperation with OLAF and, subject to the 
participation of the Member State concerned, with EPPO; 
(h) other situations or conduct of authorities that are relevant to the 
sound fi nancial management of the Union budget or the protection 
of the fi nancial interests of the Union.
In contrast to the Commission’s proposal which contained an in-
dicative list, the above list is a closed one.43 Nonetheless, its exhaustive 
character is somewhat compromised by its fi nal catch-all clause in Ar-
ticle 4(2)(h). 
Link between the rule of law violations and EU fi nances
Under Article 4(1), the second prerequisite for the imposition of mea-
sures is that the breaches of the principles of the rule of law must affect 
or ‘seriously’ risk affecting the sound fi nancial management of the EU 
budget or the protection of the EU fi nancial interests ‘in a suffi ciently 
direct way’. The glosses in quotation marks were absent in the Commis-
sion’s initial proposal.44 The fi nal text succeeds in establishing a clearer 
43  Article 4(2) of the Regulation. Cf Article 3(1) of the Commission’s Proposal (n 6).
44  See Commission Proposal (n 6) Article 3(1). In some respects the language of the Regu-
lation has been tightened (see eg Article 4(1) of the Regulation vis-à-vis Article 3, opening 
paragraph of the Commission’s proposal) but in others extended (see Article 4(2), points (c)
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connection between rule of law violations and the fi nancial interests of 
the Union, but it is still wide. The term ‘protection of the fi nancial inter-
ests of the Union’ is wider than the sound fi nancial management of the 
Union budget and may lend itself to an open-ended interpretation.
The key consideration here is the degree of proximity required. When 
can a rule of law breach that concerns one of the areas listed in Article 
4(2) be said to risk seriously affecting the sound management of the bud-
get or the EU fi nancial interests in ‘a suffi ciently direct way’? The state-
ments included in the European Council Conclusions are of limited help. 
It is stated there that the measures must be proportionate to the impact 
of the breaches on the sound fi nancial management of the budget or the 
Union’s fi nancial interests, and the causal link between such breaches 
and such negative consequences must be suffi ciently direct and duly 
established. The mere fi nding that a breach of the rule of law has taken 
place does not suffi ce to trigger the mechanism.45 It is further stated that 
the triggering factors set out in the Regulation are to be read and applied 
as a closed list of homogenous elements and not be open to factors or 
events of a different nature.46 These statements however are in them-
selves ambiguous and their legal signifi cance is unclear as the European 
Council does not have authority to interpret authentically EU law.
The expression ‘suffi ciently directly’ should be understood in the 
light of the objectives of the Regulation. The underlying idea is that there 
is a strong link between, on one hand, respect for the rule of law and, 
on the other hand, mutual trust and fi nancial solidarity among Member 
States and among the EU and the Member States. The condition is there-
fore fulfi lled where a violation of the rule of law is liable to affect directly 
that mutual trust. The fact that a breach may affect more other areas 
not concerned with EU fi nances does not mean that it does not affect 
directly the fi nancial interests of the Union. Also, it is not necessary that 
the breach must be intended to target one or more of the areas listed in 
Article 4(2) or to affect the EU budget or the EU fi nancial interests. The 
impact on the EU interests must be direct but not actual; potential effect 
suffi ces.47 Political interference with the prosecution of crime other than 
fi nancial crime may not meet the test of directness but context is every-
thing. If such interference is likely to create a climate of fear or occurs 
at a senior level of the prosecution authority it may pass the threshold. 
The more fundamental or systemic the breach is, the easier it is to sat-
isfy the requirement of directness. Would a statute that prejudices judi-
(e)(h) of the Regulation vis-à-vis Article 3(1) of the Commission Proposal).
45  July Conclusions (n 4) para 2(e).
46  ibid, para 2(f).
47  See Article 5(3) of the Regulation.
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cial independence such as that found to be incompatible with EU law in 
Commission v Poland48 meet those conditions? A constitutional court or a 
supreme court exercises overarching jurisdiction and, given its position 
at the apex of the judicial hierarchy, has a special role as the guardian 
of justice. Where the appointment of its members is found to breach the 
principle of judicial independence, such a breach reverberates through-
out the legal system and is liable to affect the administration of justice 
in all areas, including those listed in Article 4(2). It certainly poses a 
serious risk of affecting the protection of EU fi nancial interests, but does 
it do so in a suffi ciently direct way? The link can be made where there is 
pending relevant litigation.
The conundrum of guidelines
Notably, the July European Council Conclusions add a proviso to the 
application of the conditionality mechanism. They state that, with a view 
to ensuring that it is applied objectively, fairly, and with due regard to 
the equal treatment of Member States, the Commission intends to adopt 
guidelines on the way it will apply the Regulation, including a methodolo-
gy for carrying out its assessment. Such guidelines are to be developed in 
close consultation with the Member States and, until they are fi nalised, 
the Commission will not propose measures under the Regulation.49
This is an arrangement introduced to accommodate the concerns 
of Poland and Hungary. In strict law, the adoption of guidelines does not 
appear necessary as a condition for the application of the Regulation. It is 
correct that guidelines may be helpful in the interests of equal treatment, 
where the EU is empowered to impose sanctions. Thus, in the context of 
Article 260 TFEU, the CJEU has held that, in the absence of provisions 
in the Treaties, the Commission may adopt guidelines for determining 
how the lump sums or penalty payments which it intends to propose 
to the Court are calculated.50 Such guidelines help to ensure that the 
Commission acts in a manner which is transparent, foreseeable and 
consistent with legal certainty, and are designed to achieve proportion-
ality in the amounts of the penalty payments.51 However, the adoption of 
guidelines for the application of the Regulation is not a sine qua non. The 
Regulation does not provide for the imposition of fi nes but the suspen-
sion of payments due. Also, the terms of the Regulation do not have an 
inordinate degree of vagueness or ambiguity such that would make nec-
48  Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland ECLI:EU:C:2019:531.
49  July Conclusions (n 4) para 2(c).
50  See Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece ECLI:EU:C:2000:356, para 84.
51  ibid, para 87.
XVIII
essary the issue of guidelines before it can be applied. The minutes of the 
Council meeting where the Regulation was adopted include a statement 
by the Commission where the latter confi rms the declarations included 
in the European Council’s meeting.52 The legal effect of the statement is 
debatable. In Antonissen,53 the CJEU held that a declaration recorded in 
the Council minutes at the time of the adoption of a measure cannot be 
used for the purpose of interpreting it where no reference is made to the 
content of the declaration in the wording of the provision in question. 
Whether the Commission’s statement would be capable of giving rise to a 
legitimate expectation on the part of Member States that the Regulation 
will not be applied is an open question. Nonetheless, as a matter of good 
governance, one should expect the Commission to issue such guidelines.
Measures that may be taken
Article 5(1) outlines the measures that may be taken where the con-
ditions of Article 4 are fulfi lled. They are wide-ranging and include, inter 
alia, suspension of payments, disbursements, or commitments, suspen-
sion of the approval of programmes, prohibition on entering into new 
agreements on loans or other instruments guaranteed by the Union bud-
get, and a reduction of pre-fi nancing. The measures must satisfy the 
principle of proportionality.54 Care is taken to ensure the interests of 
the intended benefi ciaries of the funds frozen.55 This is however not an 
easy task as, ultimately, the duty to effect payment rests with the default 
Member State. The failure of a Member State to fulfi l its obligation to 
make payment may in itself be actionable under Francovich56 and can 
lead to enforcement proceedings by the Commission.
The July European Council Conclusions state that application of 
the mechanism will respect its subsidiary character. Measures should 
be considered only where other procedures set out in Union law, includ-
ing under the Common Provisions Regulation, the Financial Regulation 
or infringement procedures under the Treaty, would not allow to protect 
the Union budget more effectively.57 The subsidiary character of the Reg-
52  See Interinstitutional File: 2018/0136 (COD) (n 30).
53  Case C-292/89 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Antonissen 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:80, para 17. However, in other cases the Court has attributed some im-
portance to statements by the Council annexed to the minutes of its meetings. See Case 
C-24/83 Gewiese ECLI:EU:C:1984:62.
54  Article 5(3). Compliance with proportionality is also stressed in the preamble, recital 18, 
and the July Council Conclusions (n 4) para 2(e).
55  Article 5(2).
56  Joined Cases C-6 and C-9/90 Francovich and others ECLI:EU:C:1991:428.
57  July Conclusions (n 4) para 2(d).
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ulation, however, is not refl ected in the main text. The preamble states 
that measures under it are necessary ‘in particular’ in cases where other 
procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the budget to be 
protected more effectively.58 In many cases, it would make sense to have 
recourse to alternative means of enforcement but, if the conditions spec-
ifi ed in the Regulation are fulfi lled, the taking of measures under it is 
not excluded on the ground that the same conduct can also be remedied 
by other means.  
Decision-making
The procedure for the adoption of measures gives a central role to the 
Commission but entrusts the Council with the fi nal decision. The Regu-
lation strengthens the process rights of the Member State concerned and 
replaces the negative resolution procedure envisaged in the Commis-
sion’s proposal with ordinary QMV. Essentially, where the Commission 
has reasonable grounds to consider that the conditions set out in Article 
4 are fulfi lled, it initiates a process which has three phases covering 
respectively fact fi nding, bargaining, and decision-making.59 The Mem-
ber State must provide the Commission with the information requested 
and may propose remedial measures to address the Commission’s con-
cerns.60 Under the fi nal text of the Regulation, the Member State has 
two chances to present its views. First, when it answers questions raised 
by the Commission and also, subsequently, if the Commission intends 
to make a proposal to the Council. At that stage, it must give the Mem-
ber State the opportunity to submit its observations, in particular on 
the proportionality of the envisaged measures, within one month.61 The 
Regulation stresses the importance of ensuring that the Commission’s 
assessment is fair, objective, and transparent.62
The replacement of reverse QMV with positive Council action loosens 
the technocratic grip to the benefi t of politicisation. Under the Commis-
sion’s proposal, if the Commission considered that there was a violation, 
it would submit a proposal to the Council.63 The proposed measures were 
deemed to have been adopted unless the Council decided, by qualifi ed 
majority, to reject them within one month.64 Under the Regulation, where 
58  See recital 17.
59  See Article 6.
60  Article 6(5).
61  Article 6(7).
62  See preamble, recital 16, and Article 6(3).
63  Commission Proposal (n 6) Article 5(6).
64  ibid, Article 5(7).
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the Commission considers that the conditions of Article 4 are fulfi lled 
and that any remedial measures proposed by the Member State are not 
adequate, the Commission must submit a proposal to the Council within 
one month of receiving the Member State’s observations.65 The proposal 
must set out the specifi c grounds and evidence on which the Commis-
sion based its fi ndings. The Council must adopt an implementing deci-
sion within one month of receiving the Commission’s proposal.66
Thus, under the Regulation, unless the Council decides to act with-
in the time limits prescribed, no measures are imposed. In adopting the 
Commission’s proposal, the Council acts by the default procedure, ie 
qualifi ed majority.67 The Council may also amend the Commission’s pro-
posal by qualifi ed majority.68 This replaces the general rule under which 
the Council may change the Commission’s proposal only by unanimity.69
The Regulation includes elaborate provisions on the lifting of the 
measures to ensure that they are not in force any longer than necessary. 
There is both an obligation of regular review on the part of the Com-
mission and a right of the Member State to seek their lifting.70 Where, 
after regular review or the request of the Member State, the Commission 
considers that the conditions of Article 4 are no longer fulfi lled, it must 
submit a proposal to the Council for lifting the adopted measures. Where 
it considers that the situation has been remedied in part, it must submit 
a proposal for adapting the adopted measures. The fi nal decision rests 
with the Council which decides by QMV. However, where the Commis-
sion considers that the situation has not been remedied, it must adopt a 
reasoned decision and inform the Council accordingly.71 It appears that 
in such a case the Council cannot lift the measures although the Mem-
ber State may challenge the Commission’s decision before the CJEU.
65  Article 6(9). In the event that the Member State makes no observations, the Commission 
must submit its proposal without undue delay and in any case within one month after the 
deadline for the submission of the Member State’s observations.
66  Article 6(10). If exceptional circumstances arise, the period may be extended by a max-
imum of two months.
67  See Article 16(3) TEU.
68  Article 6(11).
69  See Article 293(1) TFEU. Note however that, under the exceptions stated in Article 
293(1), the general default rules do not apply to fi nancial matters, ie Articles 310, 312, 314 
and 315(2).
70  Article 7.
71  Article 7(2). See also the safeguards stated in recital 26.
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Conclusion
The recovery package adopted in December 2020 should be assessed 
positively. It links crisis management with long-term policy priorities, it 
introduces collectivisation of debt at Union level, and it is predominated 
by EU rather than inter-governmental disciplines. Although the condi-
tionality mechanism, as provided in the Regulation, lacks the long ten-
tacles of the Commission’s initial proposal, the efforts to make it blunter 
and more obtuse have only partly succeeded. In terms of substance, it 
provides some comfort for the Member States in that it requires a more 
direct link between the breaches of the rule of law and the protection of 
the fi nancial interests of the Union. In terms of process, it increases the 
procedural rights of the Member States and, by replacing reverse QMV 
with positive Council action, it increases politicisation at the expense of 
technocracy. 
The Regulation is a step forward in protecting the rule of law, albeit 
more timid than might have been hoped. It is by no means a panacea 
for the rule of law crisis that has beset the Union in recent years. Nor is 
it a panacea for the protection of EU fi nances when threatened by low-
er level non rule of law related defi ciencies. The Regulation falls into a 
more general model of the EU’s response to the rule of law crisis, namely 
strengthening the institutional and regulatory framework to limit devi-
ations by imposing procedural safeguards, recognising new roles for the 
institutions, shaping the institutional design, and providing for substan-
tive rules to contain breaches. Whether it will prove effi cacious remains 
to be seen. It will depend on the willingness of the Member States to 
uphold their commitments, the resolve of the other Member States, the 
personalities of key actors, and also institutional resilience. Sight should 
also not be lost of the fact that, as the EU concentrates more power, the 
need to safeguard rule of law principles exists not only in relation to the 
Member States but also to the EU institutions.
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